The practice of compensating executives with equity-based pay has come under recent scrutiny due to concerns that it induces excessive risk-taking. In this study, we assess the impact of stock-based pay for non-executive employees on corporate risk-taking. We cite evidence that granting an equity stake to non-executive employees increases both their level of risk aversion and their influence on, and monitoring of, corporate decision-making. Building on these observations, we argue that, ceteris paribus, compensating non-executive employees with company stock should mitigate corporate risk-taking. Consistent with our predictions, we find that subsequent corporate risk-taking decreases in the proportion of company stock owned by non-executive employees. Probing further, we find that this relationship is more pronounced when executives are compensated with equity-based compensation that is meant to induce riskseeking behavior and when the firm has weaker corporate governance.
Introduction
The practice of compensating executives with equity-based pay has come under recent scrutiny due to concerns that equity-based pay incentivizes managers to take on excessive risk.
For example, the accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing and other companies have been linked to excessive risk-taking and a fixation on stock prices. Critics have speculated that the excessive risk-taking that led to these scandals arose due to an escalation in equity-based compensation for managers (Cassidy 2002; Madrick 2003) . More recently, many believe that executive pay arrangements encouraged excessive risk-taking in the lead up to the financial crisis of 2008 (Bebchuk and Spamann 2010 . Concerns over the risk-taking incentives generated by option-based pay in particular have led to compensation restrictions for any firms that participated in the recent Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Specifically, the TARP bill required that equity compensation for employees of TARP recipients be limited to long-term restricted common stock (Bebchuk and Spamann 2010) .
The TARP regulators' requirement that equity-based pay be restricted to common stock reflects both theory and evidence that stock compensation leads managers to become more risk averse, while option-based compensation induces risk-seeking behavior in managers. The literature posits that if managers are risk averse (i.e., they have a concave utility function), then compensating them with company stock (which has a linear payoff) should not mitigate the manager's risk aversion. Moreover, the greater the manager's wealth that is invested in the company, the more undiversified the manager becomes because her investment is highly correlated with her human capital. Thus, rather than induce risk-taking behavior, an investment in company stock may actually make a manager more risk averse.
Conversely, option-based pay provides a convex payoff for a manager. Specifically, a manager makes the same return no matter how far out-of-the money the option is, but generates a linearly increasing return the greater the option is in-the-money. Thus, if a manager is compensated with enough option-based pay, the convex nature of the option payoff should make the manager more risk-seeking.
The empirical literature generally supports these conjectures when assessing the impact of equity-based compensation on executives' risk-taking behavior. Building on this evidence, our study assesses the impact of stock-based compensation for non-executive employees on corporate risk-taking. We focus on the role of stock-based compensation for non-executive employees for several reasons. First, evidence suggests that, as a percentage of total wealth, non-executive employees hold a significant portion of their assets in company stock. Thus, as with their executive counterparts, investments in company stock should increase diversification risk for non-executive employees and, in turn, increase their levels of risk aversion. Second, evidence suggests that non-executive employees with an equity stake in the firm are more likely to have an impact on setting and implementing department-and firm-wide decisions than non-executive employees who do not own company stock. Third, we cite recent evidence that suggests that equity-based pay for non-executive employees can lead to greater monitoring of other nonexecutive employees. We argue that if an equity stake for non-executive employees can increase monitoring across employees at the same organizational level (i.e., horizontal monitoring), then it is also plausible that an equity stake for non-executive employees can increase the monitoring of managers' decisions (i.e., vertical monitoring).
Taken together, we argue that if an equity stake for non-executive employees both increases the level of risk aversion among non-executive employees and leads non-executive employees to have a greater influence on, and an improved monitoring of, corporate decisionmaking, then compensating employees with company stock may mitigate corporate risk-taking in general, ceteris paribus.
Consistent with our conjectures, we find that the greater the proportion of employer stock held by non-executive employees, the lower the subsequent risk-taking by the firm. We measure risk-taking using four proxies: the standard deviation of ROA, the standard deviation of returns, the level of capital expenditure, and the R&D expense in year t+1 relative to our measure of employee ownership in year t. Interestingly, we also note that non-executive employee ownership has a much stronger impact on mitigating corporate risk-taking than executive stock ownership.
In subsequent tests, we find that, while an equity stake for non-executive employees appears to mitigate risk-taking for the firm in general, the effect is much stronger for firms that grant more stock options to their executives. Specifically, the significantly negative coefficient on the interaction term between the level of stock-based pay for non-executive employees and the level of option-based pay for executives reveals that the firm's subsequent risk-taking is significantly lower, as the product of the two variables gets larger. The implication is that equity ownership for rank-and-file employees has a particularly strong disciplining role on corporate risk-taking in those settings where managers' compensation incentivizes them to take risks.
Conversely, we find that this disciplining effect is more muted when executives are also compensated with stock. This result is consistent with our expectations because when managers are compensated with company stock, they should have less incentive to take on risk in the first place. In such a setting, the disciplining role of an equity stake for non-executive employees should become less important.
We acknowledge that the level of a firm's employee ownership is endogenous to the company and we attempt to address this endogeneity in two ways. First, we use an instrumental variables approach where we model employee ownership in a first stage regression. Our inferences do not change when we use the predicted values for employee ownership from the first stage in our main model. Second, we adopt a difference-in-difference research design by matching firms with large increases in employee ownership with firms that have no increases in employee ownership for a given year t. We then assess the risk-taking behavior of the sample and control firms in the two years before and the two years after the year in which the sample firm had a large change in ownership. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the firms with large increases in non-executive employee ownership make relatively less risky decisions in the years following the large increase in employee ownership, relative to their peers that did not have large increases.
Finally, we examine cross-sectional variation in the impact of non-executive employee ownership. We argue that if employee ownership has an impact on curtailing the firm's risktaking, then the effect should be particularly pronounced when the firm has relatively weaker corporate governance mechanisms to mitigate excessive risk-taking. Partitioning our sample across high and low governance metrics we find results consistent with this conjecture.
Specifically, the impact of employee ownership on mitigating risk-taking tends to be more pronounced when firms exhibit lower levels of corporate governance.
This study contributes to the accounting and finance literature in a number of ways. The combined results suggest that an equity stake for non-executive employees may reduce the inherent volatility of a firm's returns by mitigating the firm's desire to take on risk. Moreover, the results imply that an equity stake for non-executive employees can serve as a disciplining mechanism for executives' decisions and actions.
Separately we also note that the literature has found mixed evidence with respect to the impact of employee ownership on shareholder returns (see for example, Babenko and Sen 2011 and Kim and Ouimet 2011) . While it may be the case that employee ownership has a muted effect on improving the company's stock returns, our results suggest that employee ownership may have a positive effect on reducing the volatility of those returns. A decrease in return volatility may, in turn, help to offset the increase in diversification risk that accompanies an employee's investment in company stock. This insight might provide a partial explanation to the puzzle of why employees tend to hold such a large percentage of their wealth in employer stock.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the prior literature and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data and provides descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the results while Section 5 conducts additional analyses and robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes and presents a discussion for future research. Smith and Stulz (1985) and Stulz (1984) present an analytical framework which assesses the impact of equity-based pay on a manager's incentive to take on risk. The authors predict different outcomes depending on the nature of the equity-based pay used to compensate managers. The authors conjecture that if a risk averse manager with a concave utility function is compensated with company stock (which has a linear payoff), then the manager should not become risk-seeking because her utility function will still be concave. Moreover, the greater the manager's wealth that is invested in the company, the greater the manager's diversification risk because her investment in company stock is highly correlated with her human capital. Thus, compensating a manager with company stock may actually mitigate the manager's incentive to take on risk.
Literature review and hypothesis development
Conversely, Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that compensating managers with stock options may increase the manager's appetite for risk because options have a convex payoff.
Specifically, the payoff of the option is the same when the firm's stock price is below the exercise price, and then linearly increases in the stock price when the firm's stock price is greater than the exercise price. As the manager is compensated with more stock options, the convex nature of the option payoff should induce risk-seeking behavior in the manager.
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Empirical evidence is broadly consistent with the conjectures in Smith and Stultz (1984) .
For example, Tufano (1996) , who assesses a sample of publicly-traded gold mines, finds that executives who are compensated with stock are more likely to manage gold price risk (consistent with stock-based compensation increasing risk aversion), while executives who are compensated with options are more likely to not manage gold price risk (consistent with option compensation inducing risk-seeking behavior). Other papers find similar evidence. For example, May (1995) presents empirical evidence consistent with the hypothesis that executives with very large stock holdings undertake risk-reducing acquisitions in order to better diversify their assets. These results are consistent with stock-based pay increasing risk aversion in managers. Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) find that the sensitivity of a CEO's option-based pay is positively linked to the variation of future cash flows from exploration activities for a sample of mining firms. This result is consistent with options leading to increased risk-taking. Further evidence that executive option grants lead to greater risk-taking is provided by Chen et al. (2006) who find that the standard deviation of a firm's stock returns, along with measures of a firm's systematic and idiosyncratic risk, are increasing in the options held by executives. Coles et al. (2006) and Low (2009) assess vega, the dollar change in a CEO's option holdings for a 1% change in stock return volatility, and find that a higher sensitivity leads to riskier policy choices, more investment in R&D, and increased total, systematic, and idiosyncratic risk. Similarly, Armstrong and Vashishtha (2011) also find a positive relationship between vega and a firm's systematic risk.
Finally, Guay (1999) derives a measure of the convexity of a CEO's compensation by measuring the convexity contributed by a stock option or share of common stock as the change in the security's value for a 1% change in the annualized standard deviation of stock returns. He finds that this measure of convexity is positively correlated with R&D expenditures and investment expenditures. Taken together the collective empirical results are consistent with the argument that stock-based compensation leads to less managerial risk-taking while option-based compensation leads to increased managerial risk-taking.
While the empirical evidence generally confirms the theoretical predictions in Smith and Stulz (1985) at the executive level, we are unaware of any paper which assesses the risk-taking incentives of stock-based pay at the non-executive employee level. We argue that stock-based compensation for non-executive employees should mitigate the firm's risk-taking for three reasons.
First, while the literature (e.g., Core et al. 2003 ) reveals that executives often have a significant portion of their wealth invested in company stock, we note that the same is also true of non-executive employees. Blasi et al. (2010) find that, contingent on non-executive employees having investments in company stock, the mean value of investments in employer stock as a percentage of average pay is 65.0%. As non-executive employees appear to have a large percentage of their wealth tied up in employer stock, they should also face a diversification risk to holding company stock, similar to that of their executive counterparts. Given the increased diversification risk that accompanies an investment in company stock, we argue that stock-based compensation for non-executive employees should increase the level of risk aversion for non-executive employees.
Second, Blasi et al. (2010) Finally, evidence in Hochberg and Lindsey (2010) suggests that equity-based incentives for non-executive employees lead to increased cooperation and mutual monitoring among coworkers. The results suggest that equity-based incentives can improve "horizontal monitoring"
of employees across the same organizational level. Given this evidence, we consider it plausible that equity-based incentives may also lead non-executive employees to increasingly "vertically monitor" management's decisions.
Taken together, if an increased equity stake for non-executive employees leads to both an increased level of risk aversion amongst non-executive employees and an increased propensity 2 The General Social Survey assesses a national area probability sample of noninstitutionalized adults. for employees to both participate in decision making and actively monitor corporate decisions, then an equity stake for non-executive employees may lead the firm to take on less risky projects in general. Thus, we state our first hypothesis in alternative form as:
H1: Corporate risk-taking decreases in the level of non-executive employees' stock ownership.
We next assess how stock-based pay for non-executive employees affects corporate risktaking, conditional on the type of equity-based pay used to compensate executives. As we discuss in the introduction, a concern with granting executives options is that, in some cases, this form of compensation can induce excessive risk-taking. If a firm compensates its managers with options and its non-executive employees with stock (which should increase risk aversion among non-executive employees), we argue that the firm should make less risky decisions than a firm that compensates executives with options and does not provide stock-based compensation to non-executive employees. Conversely, if both executive and non-executive employees are compensated with company stock, then presumably neither party has an incentive to seek risk, as their respective payoffs will be linear in the firm's stock price. As executives should have a more muted incentive to make risky decisions when they are compensated with stock, equity stakes for non-executive employees should mitigate risk-seeking incentives to a lesser extent when executives are compensated with stock than when executives are compensated with options. These points lead to the following joint hypothesis, stated in alternative form:
H2a: The impact of non-executive employee stock ownership on mitigating corporate risktaking increases in the proportion of stock options in the executive's compensation.
H2b: The impact of non-executive employee stock ownership on mitigating corporate risktaking is lower when executives are compensated with stock than when executives are compensated with options.
Sample and descriptive statistics

Sample
We obtain data on employee stock ownership following the methodology of Bova et al. (2011) . Specifically, we search the United States Department of Labor Form 5500 filings for defined contribution plans that allow direct investment in the employer's stock and aggregate the holdings across plans for every firm-year. Similar to Bova et al. (2011) , we consider "employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), 401(k) plans that allow an investment in employer stock as an option, deferred profit sharing plans in which part of the profit sharing contribution is invested in employer stock, and employer stock bonus plans" (p. 14). When there are discontinuities in the data time series for a particular firm, we impute the missing observation for year t as the average of year t-1 and t+1. In the regression analysis, we scale the non-executive employees' stock holdings by the firm's market value of equity (EOSTKI).
The nature of the of the investment vehicles we assess makes us believe that our measure of equity ownership proxies well for the company stock held by non-executive employees.
Specifically, as Bova et al. (2011) point out, when assessing the total sample of firms with either ESOPs or non-ESOP employee ownership vehicles (or both), roughly 29.7% of the firms have ESOP plans while 83.4% have non-ESOP plans.
stipulates that "highly compensated" employees cannot account for more than 30% of participants in the ESOP. 4 This restriction precludes managers and executives from holding the majority of ESOP assets, as managers and executives are among the most "highly compensated" employees in the firm. Given the large proportion of equity provided by ESOPs when constructing our aggregate employee ownership variable, we are comfortable in our assertion that our aggregate employee ownership measure proxies well for employer stock held by nonexecutive employees, as opposed to employer stock held by managers or executives.
We match the Form 5500 filings data to Compustat using the Employer Identification Number (EIN). This procedure results in 60,235 observations for 9,677 individual firms for the period 1999-2009. As we also require data on the structure of executive compensation, we next merge the data set with Execucomp. This step decreases the sample size to 18,417 observations for 5,371 individual companies. In the multiple regression analysis we require additional financial and market data, obtained from Compustat Annual and CRSP, respectively. These requirements result in variation in the sample size across tests.
Risk-taking proxies
Following the extant literature (e.g., Guay 1999), we consider several alternative measures of risk-taking. Our first measure, SD_RET, focuses on equity risk as reflected in the volatility of stock returns. While a popular proxy for risk, the calculation of the metric varies across studies (e.g., Chen et al. 2006, Core and Guay 1999) . To minimize noise, we measure the variable as the standard deviation of daily stock returns for the 12-month period starting from the fifth month after fiscal year-end. As a robustness test, however, we repeat the analyses using the idiosyncratic volatility measured as the standard deviation of the market-model residuals over the same period. Results (untabulated) remain qualitatively the same.
Our second proxy aims to capture the volatility of a firm's fundamentals (e.g., Beaver et al. 1970) . Specifically, we construct the measure, SD_∆ROA, as the standard deviation of seasonally differenced quarterly return on assets over the subsequent five years, where return on assets is income before extraordinary items (Compustat item IBQ) scaled by average total assets for the quarter (Compustat items [ATQ q + ATQ q-1 ] / 2).
A common characteristic of these proxies is that they measure risk-taking indirectly.
That is, both metrics reflect the impact of firm activities through the prism of equity investors or the set of accounting rules, each of which could potentially induce noise or even distortions. To address this issue, we also consider two direct measures of corporate risk-taking: investment in research and development, R&D, and capital expenditures, CAPEX (e.g., Guay 1999). We measure R&D as the annual research and development expense (Compustat item XRD) scaled by net sales (Compustat item SALE) and CAPEX as the annual capital expenditure (Compustat item CAPX) scaled by net property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item PPENT). We calculate both ratios for year t+1. To mitigate the potential influence of outliers, we winsorize the sample at 1 percent and 99 percent. 
Descriptive statistics
Requiring data on executive compensation skews the sample towards larger companies.
As reported in Table 1 , Panel A, the average (median) company in the sample has market capitalization of $4.2 billion ($484 million). Non-executive employees hold on average 0.8 percent of the employer's stock through defined contribution plans, however, the holdings vary notably within the sample (0 percent and 0.4 percent for the first and third quartile, respectively) and are heavily skewed. The company stock held by the top four executives is on average higher (3.5 percent of the shares outstanding), however, varies significantly as well. Stock option grants for the average company account for 31.4 percent of the total executive compensation, however, can be as little (much) as 0.0 (97.4) percent.
Turning to the risk-taking proxies, the standard deviation of seasonally-differenced ROA and returns for the average (median) company is 0.051 and 0.039 (0.021 and 0.031),
respectively. The R&D expense for the average (median) company accounts for 15.9 (5.2) percent of net sales, while capital expenditures are 27.5 (21.8) percent of net property, plan, and equipment on average (in the median). Importantly, each of the four measures varies significantly within the sample.
We report the correlations between the main variables of interest in Table 1 , Panel B.
Consistent with the conjecture that corporate risk-taking decreases in non-executive stock ownership, the correlations between EOSTKI and each of the risk-taking proxies are significantly negative. In accordance with theory and extant empirical research, the correlation between the proportion of executive compensation attributable to option grants, OPTEXP, and the risk-taking measures are all positive. Interestingly, the proportion of the company shares outstanding held by executives, EXECSTK, is also positively correlated with SD_∆ROA, SD_RET, and CAPEX at odds with the claim that executive ownership mitigates risk-taking.
The variable, however, is significantly negatively associated with R&D, consistent with arguments in, among others, Coles et al (2006) . While univariate in nature, these results provide preliminary evidence on the relationship between compensation and corporate risk-taking.
Results
Employee ownership and corporate risk-taking
As a first step in testing our conjecture that corporate risk-taking decreases in nonexecutive employee stock ownership, we regress the set of risk-taking proxies on EOSTKI. To control for industry-specific and macro-economic factors, we include industry and time fixed
effects. 6 The model takes the form:
where CRT is one of the four measures of risk-taking -SD_∆ROA, SD_RET, R&D, or CAPEX -and EOSTKI is the non-executive employees' aggregate holdings of the employer stock in year t scaled by the firm's market value of equity. We estimate the models using ordinary least squares and allow the errors to cluster by company (Petersen, 2009) . To be consistent with our conjecture, we expect β 1 to be negative.
To address a potential correlated omitted variables problem, we augment equation (1) with a menu of control variables. First, we include executive stock ownership and option-based compensation as our main control variables. As discussed in the previous sections, executive compensation plays an important role in determining the risk tolerance in a company. While options increase the propensity to undertake risky projects, stock-based compensation mitigates this tendency. Thus, we include the value of option awards in year t as percentage of total compensation and the percentage of the firm's shares outstanding owned by the top four executives (Chairman of the Board, CEO, CFO, and President).
Next, we include six additional variables identified as important controls in analyzing the relationship between risk-taking and compensation (Tufano 1996 , Core and Guay 1999 , Chen et al. 2006 , Coles et al. 2006 . First, we include the log-transformed market value of equity (MV;
Compustat items CSHO*PRCC_F) at the end of year t, as control for a firm's economy of scale and cost of external financing. Second, to account for the firm's set of growth and investment opportunities, we include the book-to-market value of equity ratio (BM; Compustat items CEQ / (CSHO*PRCC_F)) at the end of year t. We also consider leverage (LEV) and free cash flows (CF) as measures of financial distress and capital availability, respectively. We define leverage as the three-year average of short-term and long-term debts scaled by total assets (Compustat items (DLC t + DLTT t ) / AT t ) and free cash flow as the three-year average of cash flow from operations minus cash flow from investing and cash dividends scaled by total assets (Compustat items (OANCF t -IVNCF t -DV t ) / AT t ), both measured from year t-2 through t. Fifth, to control for the tax implications of the compensation structure, we include an indicator variable set to one if a company has a positive net operating loss carry-forward (NOL; Compustat item TLCF) in year t, zero otherwise. Last, we control for the return on the company's stock for fiscal year t.
The expanded model takes the form: Turning to the control variables, we document positive and significant coefficients on stock option grants for executives across all models, consistent with extant evidence that options increases corporate risk-taking. We also find a negative and significant association between executive stock-holdings and SD_∆ROA, however, the partial correlations with SD_RET, R&D, and CAPEX are marginal or insignificant.
These results are consistent with our conjecture that corporate risk-taking materially decreases in non-executive employee stock ownership. Importantly, we find that the effect is incremental to that of executive stock holdings and executive option grants and is robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls considered in prior compensation studies. We next turn to the joint effect of executive and non-executive compensation on corporate risk-taking.
The interaction between non-executive and executive incentives
To test H2a and H2b, we modify equation (2) by interacting EOSTKI with executive stock holdings and option grants:
To support our second hypothesis, we expect a negative 4 and a non-negative 3 in equation (3). As before, we estimate the regressions using ordinary least squares, allow the errors to cluster by company, and include industry and year fixed effects.
We report regression results in Overall, the results suggest that non-executive employee ownership plays a particularly strong role in mitigating corporate risk-taking for firms which grant more option to executive.
As both executive and non-executive stock ownership work in the same direction with respect to corporate risk-taking, there is generally no significant interaction between the two stock ownership variables.
Endogeneity
We acknowledge that employee stock ownership is endogenous to corporate behavior.
Although we measure the dependent variables in the year after we measure EOSTKI and include an extensive set of control variables in the regression models, endogeneity remains a concern.
We address this issue in two ways: an instrumental variables and a difference-in-differences estimators.
Instrumental Variables
As one solution to the endogeneity problem, we consider a Two Stage Least Square estimator (2SLS), modeling EOSTKI in the first stage. A critical factor for the successful implementation of the estimator is the identification of variables correlated with EOSTKI but not correlated with the error term in the second-stage model (Greene 2003) .
Following prior research (e.g., Bova et al. 2011) , we model EOSTKI as a function of tax and employee retention considerations associated with non-executive equity ownership. In particular, we consider the effective tax rate for the company-year (CASHETR) as tax considerations have been shown to be important drivers for the adoption of employee stock ownership plans (Beatty 1994) . Following Dyreng et al. (2008), we calculate CASHETR as the cash outlay for tax purposes scaled by pre-tax income excluding special items over the past five years (Compustat items TXPD, PI, and SPI, respectively).
Turning to employee retention, we consider two region-specific factors: the firm's "local beta" (LOCBETA) and enforceability of non-competition agreements (NCOMPENF). The use of LOCBETA is motivated by arguments that a company's stock price is correlated with the employees' outside opportunities. Thus, as equity compensation serves as an employee-retention tool, the propensity to use an employee stock ownership plan to compensate employees should increase in the firm's price co-movement with the competing employers in the area (Kedia and We expect θ 1 and θ 2 to be positive and θ 3 to be negative. Using the coefficients from equation (4) 
where all variables are as defined before. As before, we estimate a pooled OLS regression with industry and year fixed effects and errors clustered by company, and expect β 1 to be negative.
We report results for the 2SLS analysis in 
Difference-in-Differences
As an alternative treatment of the endogeneity problem inherent in the relationship between employee stock ownership plans and corporate risk-taking, we consider a difference-indifferences specification. In particular, we identify firm-years with economically significant increase in EOSTKI and benchmark the change in the risk-taking proxies between the periods to a matched sample of companies with EOSTKI that do not change materially during the period.
Defining "material increase" entails a trade-off: While higher cut-offs would provide a cleaner test, it would also lead to a smaller sample, decreasing the power of the tests. As a compromise, we select an increase of 0.5 percent of the firm's market value of equity as the cutoff, which results in a sample of 246 firm-years. We match the "increase" sample with a control sample by year, industry, size, and book-to-market. Specifically, we match each observation with material increases in EOSTKI to a set of companies in the same 4-digit SIC code industry that do not have a material change in employee ownership during the year and are within 30 percent of the size of the treatment firm. From this pool, we retain the company with the closest market-to-book ratio.
We collect data for each pair of observations for the two years before and the two years after the material change in employee ownership. We define two indicator variables: D EO , which is set to 1 for the observations with material change in EOSTKI, 0 otherwise; and, D AFTER , which is set to 1 (0) for the period after (before) the material increase in employee ownership. The model takes the form:
Turning to CRT, here we use only SD_RET, R&D, and CAPEX as proxies for corporate risk-taking. We do not consider SD_∆ROA as its measurement requires five years of data which
induces an overlap between the pre-and post-periods. Consistent with our conjecture, we expect a negative β 3 .
We present the results from the difference-in-differences specification in Table 5 .
Notably, the coefficient on D EO is insignificantly different from zero in each of the three models, suggesting that the matching algorithm is effective. Turning to the interactive term, β 3 is negative in each model and significant in two of the three models providing further support to the conjecture that ESOP leads to lower risk-taking. The coefficients magnitude implies that for the average treatment company relative to the control group, the decrease in SD_RET, R&D, and CAPEX around the increase in non-executive employee stock ownership corresponds to 0.001 / 0.039 = 2.56, 0.038 / 0.116 = 32.76, and 0.029 / 0.225 = 12.89 percent, respectively.
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In summary, we address potential endogeneity concerns using an instrument variable approach and a difference-in-difference research design. Under both methodologies we find strong evidence that non-executive employee ownership mitigates corporate risk-taking, suggesting that endogeneity is not driving the documented results.
Additional analysis and robustness checks
Cross-sectional variations in the impact of non-executive employee ownership
The results from our analysis thus far are consistent with the conjecture that corporate risk-taking decreases in non-executive employee stock ownership. One potential explanation for this relationship is that employees provide an additional level of oversight. This raises a question as to whether non-executive employee stock ownership is subsumed by other oversight mechanisms. As prior research provides ample evidence that corporate governance plays an important role in disciplining companies, we explore the issue by examining the association between EOSTKI and corporate risk-taking across high-and low-quality governance settings.
As a measure of corporate governance, we consider oversight provided by the Board of Directors, measured as the proportion of independent directors. Specifically, as prior research document's that board effectiveness increases in the proportion of independent directors (e.g., Klein 2002; Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990) we expect that employee oversight plays stronger (weaker) role in companies with fewer (more) independent directors.
We partition the sample relative to the median percentage of independent directors on the board every year, where companies with below (above) median percentage of independent directors are classified as Low (High) governance firms. We report results from equation (2) in Table 6 . Consistent with our conjecture, in each of the four models, the coefficient on EOSTKI is lower in the High relative to the Low governance subsamples. For the Low governance sample, the EOSTKI coefficient is highly significant across all four models. For the High governance subsample, the EOSTKI coefficient is only statistically significant in one out of four models. Turning to economic significance, the EOSTKI coefficient ratio between the High and Low subsamples ranges from 23% to 75% across the four risk-taking proxies.
In summary, we find evidence that the mitigating effect on corporate risk-taking of nonexecutive employee stock ownership is pronounced more strongly in environments with lower quality corporate governance, suggesting that different oversight mechanism may complement each other.
Time-series variations in the impact of non-executive employee ownership
To shed further evidence on the oversight role of employee stock ownership, we also explore changes in the regulatory and macro-economic environment. In particular, over the last decade we have witnessed a heated debate on the accounting for, and role of, stock options in the economy. The controversy culminated with the Financial Accounting Standards Board requiring firms to mandatorily expense stock options starting from 2006. Evidence in Brown and Lee (2007) , suggests that, following the adoption of mandatory option expensing, firms utilized options less often in their compensation structure. We argue that, as option use declined from 2006 onwards, the risk-taking incentives brought on by option use should have also declined in aggregate across the economy. Thus, if our conjectured relationships between equity-based pay and risk are correct, the role of non-executive employee equity stakes in mitigating corporate risk-taking should have diminished from 2006 onwards, as the incentive for executives to take risks should have waned with the more limited use of options-based compensation, and, in turn, mitigated the disciplining role of stock-based pay for non-executive employees.
We utilize the change in accounting for stock options in 2006 and allow the coefficients on OPTEXP and EOSTKI in equation (2) for non-executive employees should play a more limited role in reducing risk-taking, when executives have less incentive to take risk.
Alternative specifications of non-executive employee ownership
In the main analysis, we scale non-executive employees' holdings by a firm's outstanding shares. As an alternative specification, motivated from analysis completed in Bova et al. (2011), we define EOSTKI as the logarithm of one plus the dollar value of employer stock per employee. Dollar value may be more relevant for non-executive employees than for executives, given that rank-and-file employees are less wealthy and are more risk averse to financial losses. In untabulated analysis, we find that our results continue to hold with this alternative specification.
For example, in Panel B of Table 2 , the coefficient on EOSTKI becomes -0.700 (t=-6.26) in Model (1). Note that the magnitude of coefficients is not comparable because of the scaling issue, but statistical significance is comparable.
Conclusion and discussion
In this study we assess the impact of stock-based pay for non-executive employees on corporate risk-taking. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the greater the amount of company stock owned by non-executive employees, the lower the firm's subsequent risk-taking.
Probing further, we find that this relationship is more pronounced when managers are compensated with option-based pay (which we argue induces risk-seeking behavior in managers) and when the firm has weaker corporate governance. Finally, the results continue to be robust after using both an instrumental variable and matched sample approach to addressing endogeneity issues, and after using an alternate proxy for the amount of non-executive employee wealth tied up in company stock.
The combined results suggest that an equity stake for non-executive employees may reduce the inherent volatility of a firm's returns by mitigating the firm's desire to take on risk.
The results additionally imply that giving an equity stake to non-executive employees can create a disciplining mechanism for executives' decisions and actions.
Our evidence may also provide an avenue for a future rethinking of the pros and cons of an investment in company stock for non-executive employees. Since the seminal work on portfolio selection in Markowitz (1952) , many papers have focused on the costs to insufficient diversification when employees invest in company stock (e.g., Benartzi 2001 , Cohen 2009 ).
Most of the arguments against investing in company stock stress that, because an investment in company stock is highly correlated with an employee's human capital, an investment in company stock represents a suboptimal portfolio allocation choice for employees. These concerns have grown stronger following the collapse of Enron, where it was revealed that 60% of employees' 401k holdings were invested in Enron stock.
9 Incidents like the Enron bankruptcy have led to renewed calls to limiting worker involvement in shared capitalism and employee ownership plans in general.
Our results, however, suggest that investments in company stock may drive a firm to pursue less risky projects, which, in turn, may lead to less volatile stock returns for the firm. We argue that a decrease in return volatility may partially offset the increase in diversification risk that accompanies an investment in employer stock. This insight may, in turn, have implications for portfolio theory. Specifically, while evidence in the literature (e.g., Benartzi 2001) seems to suggest that shareholders do not achieve higher returns when employees invest in company stock (i.e., there is a muted first moment effect on returns when employees invest in the company), our results suggest that there may be an a reduction in return volatility, the greater the level of an employee's equity stake in the firm (i.e., there may be a positive second moment effect on returns when employees invest in the company). Considering this latter point, it is possible that, from a portfolio perspective, investments in an employee's company may not be as suboptimal as traditionally thought.
These insights may also provide a rational explanation for the frequently studied puzzle of why employees appear to overinvest in company stock (see Bergman and Jenter 2007; Cohen 2009 ). If employees' investments in company stock lead the firm to pursue less risky projects, then an "overinvestment" in company stock may be rational and potentially optimal on the employee's part, as it reduces the return volatility of both the employee's investment in company stock and her human capital provided that she continues to work for the firm. We leave any analyses arising from these observations for future research. = + + + + where refers to the monthly return of a particular stock, is the monthly return of the stock's corresponding MSA index, is the monthly return of the market portfolio, and is the monthly return of one of the 48 Fama-French industries corresponding to stock i. All returns are in excess of monthly T-bill rates.
NCOMPENF
= Non-competition enforceability index compiled by Garmaise (2011) .
Annual COMPUSTAT data items are provided in parentheses. All variables are as defined in Appendix I. Each year, all variables except for MV, SD_RET, NOL, and RET are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. We estimate the regressions using OLS and allow the errors to cluster by firm. Each regression includes industry and year fixed effects (FE), where the industries are defined over the 48 Fama-French (1997) classification. We report t-statistics in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. All variables are as defined in Appendix I. Each year, all variables except for MV, SD_RET, NOL, and RET are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. We estimate the regressions using OLS and allow the errors to cluster by firm. Each regression includes industry and year fixed effects (FE), where the industries are defined over the 48 Fama-French (1997) classification. We report t-statistics in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. P_EOSTKI is the predicted value when regressing EOSTKI on CASHER, LOCBETA, and NCOMPENF. All other variables are as defined in Appendix I. Each year, all variables except for MV, SD_RET, NOL, and RET are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. We estimate the regressions using OLS and allow the errors to cluster by firm. Each regression includes industry and year fixed effects (FE), where the industries are defined over the 48 Fama-French (1997) classification. We report t-statistics in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. The employee ownership sample includes 246 firm-years with at 0.5% increase in employee ownership as a percentage of the firm's market value of equity. We match each employee ownership observation to a firm with no big ownership increase by year and industry (4-digit SIC), firm size (within 30% of the employee ownership firm), and the closest book-to-market ratio. Then we take observations in the two years before and two years after the match year as the final sample. D EO is an indicator variable with the value of 1 for firms with significant increases in employee ownership (0.5%) and 0 for matched firms. D AFTER is an indicator variable with the value of 1 for the years after the match year and 0 for the years before. All other variables are as defined in Appendix I. All variables except for MV, SD_RET, NOL, and RET are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. We estimate the regressions using OLS and report t-statistics in parentheses below the coefficients. Corporate governance is measured as the percentage of independent directors on the board. High and Low refer to the subsamples with below-and above-median corporate governance, respectively. All other variables are as defined in Appendix I. Each year, all variables except for MV, SD_RET, NOL, and RET are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. We estimate the regressions using OLS and allow the errors to cluster by firm. Each regression includes industry and year fixed effects (FE), where the industries are defined over the 48 Fama-French (1997) classification. We report t-statistics in parentheses below the estimated coefficients.
